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Guest Editorial: Alternative Valuations 
Ton Otto and Steffen Dalsgaard 
This issue of Valuation Studies presents an anthropological take on 
‘alternative valuations’. The three articles in this issue stem from a 
workshop held in August 2012 at James Cook University in Cairns, 
Australia. The workshop was organized by the authors of this 
commentary along with Bruce Kapferer, and the focus was on Values 
of Dominance and Difference. The contributions came from 
anthropologists, sociologists and economists especially, and there was 
a strong focus on affairs that were relevant to an Australian audience 
at the time. One collection of contributions was later published in the 
Australian interdisciplinary journal eTropic with a focus on 
transvaluation and globalization (Dalsgaard and Otto 2014). The 
present contributions are all anthropological and were collected 
because they bring three distinct approaches to the theme of 
alternative valuations. On first sight the articles go in divergent 
directions but collectively and in relation to each other they illustrate 
present limitations as well as potential future directions of 
anthropological theorizing on value.  
The 2012 workshop was a continuation and development of a 
workshop that was held in December 2011, also at James Cook 
University, entitled The Anthropology of Value. The aim of this earlier 
workshop was to explore the possibility of an anthropological theory 
of value. Whereas all participants agreed that value was a productive 
analytical lens through which to look at and describe certain cultural 
and social processes, opinions were starkly divided as to whether a 
distinct anthropological contribution to theory was possible and even 
desirable. The revised contributions have been published as two special 
issues of HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, edited by Ton Otto 
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and Rane Willerslev (2013a, 2013b). In the introduction the two 
editors represented the two main opposing opinions concerning the 
status and possible development of an anthropological theory of value 
(Otto and Willerslev 2013c). Willerslev maintained that anthropology’s 
role was not to develop a grand theory about value but rather to wage 
a kind of intellectual guerilla warfare against major theories—as 
provided by other disciplines—based on concrete ethnographic cases 
that challenged existing assumptions and theoretical premises. Otto, 
on the other hand, argued that anthropology had contributed some 
important theoretical ideas to general social theory on value and that 
ethnographic fieldwork certainly could and should be an inspiration to 
theory formation, but conversely that field research was also 
productively inspired and driven by theoretical questions. The 2012 
workshop from which the present collection derives engaged in a 
wider debate between disciplines and considered practical challenges 
resulting from conflicting principles of valuation. The present 
collection refers to this wider engagement, but takes up again the 
question of anthropological contributions to theories of value and 
valuation. 
Anthropology has a long history of theoretical investment in value 
questions. Following the seminal and long-lasting influence of Marcel 
Mauss’s work on The Gift (1990), numerous anthropologists have 
remained concerned with identifying cultural and social impulses in 
and to economic thinking and practice. Especially in recent decades 
this debate has been reinvigorated through a renewed focus on 
different approaches to the concept of value (e.g. Graeber 2001), or 
the opposition between notions of the singular and primarily economic 
‘value’ and the plural and primarily cultural ‘values’ (Miller 2008). A 
dominant theme in these debates has been the role of the culturally 
implicit background of economic value and valuation. Some have 
drawn inspiration from Polanyi substantivism (e.g. Hann and Hart 
2009) or Dumontian structuralism (Robbins 2013), while a long-
standing voice such as that of Marshall Sahlins (1976, 2013) has 
argued since the 1970s that western economism itself is a particular 
cultural form of reasoning. 
Anthropological approaches to value and valuation are naturally 
impacted by the way the term is also a key analytical concept in the 
social sciences more generally, even if its meaning and application vary 
widely according to discipline and field of study. In a simplifying but 
still valid way one can distinguish between (at least) three social 
domains that are treated differently. In the cultural-religious domain, 
values are part of the identification of ethnic and religious groups who 
distinguish themselves by their different worldviews and cultural 
practices. In the political domain, values—such as human liberty, 
democracy, security, well-being—are considered as the basis for 
political organization and policymaking. Finally, the economic domain 
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focuses on the production of wealth and specializes in the 
measurement of value to allow for the comparison and exchange of 
different things and practices (including labour).  
There is extensive scholarship on the historic development and 
hierarchical relationship between these domains or spheres, for 
example Louis Dumont’s (1977) analysis of the emergence of an 
economic ideology in the West that diverged from and later dominated 
religious and political ideologies, and Bruce Kapferer’s more recent 
work on the emergence of the corporate state, which is subordinated 
to and controlled by the terms of the market (e.g. 2010).  
Needless to say, no matter how such spheres are conceptualized and 
defined, they will frequently overlap, and both past and recent 
anthropological work has been concerned with identifying their 
interrelationships, including for instance how economic valuation is 
symbolically constituted (Sahlins 1976); how commodification and the 
‘individualized’ entrepreneurial action praised by neoliberal economics 
depends on relational factors such as kinship (Elyachar 2005), or on 
gift-giving and reciprocity (Tsing 2015); or how political ‘values’ and 
objects of governance become organized through numerical rankings 
and indicators (Shore and Wright 2015). The role of economic 
performativity stressed by scholars focusing on science and technology 
studies (e.g. MacKenzie et al. 2007) has furthermore begun to gain 
influence in anthropological studies of the (communicative) making of 
the economy (e.g. Holmes 2014). 
Anthropological theorizing has remained concerned with two key 
questions, where value conflict and/or domination come to the fore. 
First, there is the question of the underlying model of society that 
we use. Since the birth of the social sciences, scholars have argued over 
the extent to which ‘society’ is primarily based on a consensus of 
values or rather on difference and negotiated conflict. Is it vital for a 
sustainable society to have a hierarchy of values in place or is it 
necessary and possible to accommodate an ongoing process of value 
negotiation and conflict? This is a crucial issue in today’s world, where 
value differences are often represented as fundamental and non-
negotiable—cf. Samuel Huntington’s idea of a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ (1996). Value conflicts occur not only between nations 
and ethnic groups but are also part of the political process within 
modern (corporate) states. The ‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement was a 
case in point demonstrating the development and expression of anti-
hegemonic values across the western world. The strong division caused 
by the 2007‒2008 so-called ‘Intervention’ in Australia also highlighted 
the potential contradictions between core political values such as the 
human right to freedom and the state’s obligations to protect human 
life (security) (Sutton 2009; Lattas and Morris 2010). 
The second key concern, which is the one the articles in this issue 
are addressing in different ways, is whether practices of the market 
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and the state implicitly create a hierarchy of values that is no longer 
discussed and thus constitutes a hegemonic environment that silences 
alternative valuations. We refer to the development of universal 
standards of value measurement, such as money, in the market 
economy and corresponding measures of categorization and 
enumeration practised by modern states to map, monitor, control and 
service their citizens. Both complexes, market and state, imply a drive 
to totalizing systems of comparison and control that set the tacit 
background for more explicit discussions and conflicts about value 
(such as engaged by the Occupy movement). As a reaction to and 
correction of the dominance of monetary value standards, alternative 
measurements systems are being developed to support policy decisions 
such as the ‘quality of life’, ‘social quality’ and ‘social well-being 
index’. But the premises on which these alternative standards are based 
often still appear to reproduce basic assumptions of the economic 
model. 
In the invitation, the contributors to the Cairns workshop were 
asked to address the following two questions in particular.  
1. In view of the power as well as the obvious limitations of 
monetary systems for comparing and measuring different kinds of 
values, is the development of alternative systems for comparing and 
quantifying values such as ‘quality of life’ or ‘social wellbeing’ a viable 
and desirable solution or rather the reproduction of a biased model, 
that excludes alternative forms of valuation?  
2. How can societies deal with different value systems in a way that 
does not lead to the total domination of one system by another? Can 
we design political institutions that make it possible to discuss, 
negotiate, and even generate value differences both within and 
between political, economic and cultural units? 
The articles in this collection thus explore and present studies of 
systems where there are qualitative and political contests between 
different and alternative values and valuation forms, and especially 
reactions to the attempt to realize one dominant system of valuation 
whether it is quantified estimations of carbon (non)emission, market 
exchange or appreciations of biodiversity. 
Simon Foale, Michelle Dyer and Jeff Kinch’s contribution deals 
with the question of how biodiversity is valued by different groups of 
users and stakeholders. Their regional focus is on rural Melanesia in 
the South Pacific and here they observe a stark contrast between the 
valuation by transnational conservationists on the one hand and 
Melanesian subsistence farmers and fishers on the other. Whereas the 
former ascribe an intrinsic value to biodiversity, based on biological 
and philosophical assumptions about the irreplaceable value of 
individual species, the latter have a more pragmatic attitude towards 
the species existing in their environment based on their need to sustain 
a livelihood in it. The opposition is evident and in order to convince 
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rural Melanesians to support conservationist agendas, the trans-
national conservationists try to argue for the local economic value of 
biodiversity. These arguments however do not carry much persuasive 
power for people who experience in daily subsistence practice that a 
reduction of the species they use can actually lead to greater yield and 
return on their energy input.  
From a comparative-theoretical perspective, the interesting issue in 
this conflict of valuations is in the way the authors interpret the 
different value perspectives. Whereas western transnational 
conservationists appear to base their valuation on ideological premises, 
Melanesians are presented as taking a more praxis-oriented approach 
prompted by the demands of living in a certain environment. This 
opposition is reminiscent of Sahlins’s famous discussion of two main 
strands of theorizing in anthropology: a focus on culture versus a focus 
on practical reason (1976). In Sahlins’s view anthropologists have 
made a faulty opposition between the West and the Rest. Whereas 
non-western societies have been interpreted as being dominated by 
culture, the West is depicted as driven by other forces that are 
summarized under the term ‘practical reason’, which includes 
economic development and technological adaptation. Sahlins’s key 
argument is that the apparent economism of the West in fact is a form 
of cultural reason as well. For example he contends that the 
motivation to gather interest on money, a key capitalistic principle, is 
not based on a universal drive for maximization but is rather 
engendered by a culturally defined value. Thus western societies are as 
much culturally grounded as non-western ones (see also Sahlins 2013, 
2015). 
The case presented by Foale, Dyer and Kinch appears to turn 
Sahlins’s argument on its head. While the global conservationists are 
portrayed as being motivated by cultural valuations of nature, 
Melanesian farmers are depicted as pursuing a practical logic of 
adaptation and maximization of effort. Foale et al. argue that 
conservationists have to take these practical considerations into 
account, when they are dealing with local populations in Melanesia. 
Does their finding indicate that the West has turned to cultural reason 
in its relation to nature, while non-western societies should be seen as 
sustaining more utilitarian concerns? This is of course a simplified 
reading of the carefully argued and richly documented article by Foale, 
Dyer and Kinch, but the article clearly shows that Sahlins’s dichotomy 
is still relevant to think with. Do cultural values uphold a certain 
autonomy and arbitrariness as cultural systems in relation to the 
objective world they mediate, or are they imbued with practical 
determinants deriving from human action in a social and natural 
environment? And what happens when people guided by different 
principles of valuation try to persuade and influence each other? Are 
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there ways to create a common language to discuss and compare the 
value of the different interests?   
Dealing with an ethnographic case from Mozambique, where 
market women engage in some form of reciprocal relations with 
subterranean dwarfish twins to increase their sales, Bjørn Bertelsen can 
be seen to take the opposition between culture and practical reason in 
another direction. At face value he appears to be caught in the same 
dualism, between an economic (practical reason) understanding of 
value and a cultural one. He acknowledges the presence of both kinds 
of valuation, but argues against an implicit or explicit assumption 
among many analysts, that cultural valuations are dominated by or 
encompassed by the encroaching value logic of the market. For 
example, he criticizes Comaroff and Comaroff’s concept of ‘occult 
economies’ for implying the dominance of capitalism in African 
societies where witchcraft and other ‘occult’ practices are interpreted 
as constituting the dark underbelly of capital itself (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1999). According to Bertelsen one needs to accept that there 
are two different systems at play, without any one being dominant 
over the other. So it appears that Bertelsen, in contrast to Foale et al., 
defends the continuing importance and vigour of cultural reason in 
non-western cultures in contrast to the practical western market logic.  
In an apparent return to older theoretical positions, the critical 
contribution that Bertelsen is making lies in his understanding of 
cultural value as an expression of human generativity. The 
ethnography of the reciprocal but also mutually exploitative relations 
between the market women and the dwarf couple can be interpreted 
from the point of view of the valuation of generativity. Bertelsen finds 
theoretical support for this perspective in David Graeber’s important 
book Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value (2001), which 
considers ‘creative potential’ as the key to understanding value. 
Moreover, Bertelsen links this understanding of value to Deleuze’s 
concept of the virtual as a component of the real, in addition and 
contrast to the actual. The virtual component of reality can become 
actualized in tangible phenomena through human action. Interestingly, 
Bertelsen finds additional inspiration in the philosophy of Cornelius 
Castoriadis with its focus on social transformation, human autonomy 
and self-creation. Here we are at the brink of a new understanding of 
culture as a continuously creative endeavour that builds on virtual 
realities as much as on actual ones. 
Steffen Dalsgaard’s article on the emergence of carbon valuations 
allows us to extend this line of thought on the basis of alternative 
cultural forms of valuation that are actually emerging globally. Carbon 
value can be seen as a way for states and other institutional actors to 
direct and stimulate desired behaviour. So far there is nothing new. The 
truly interesting development is that carbon value makes a claim to be 
able to compare actions and non-actions, things and non-things. In 
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other words: actualities and virtualities. In carbon valuation the 
descriptions and measurement of alternative worlds—such as the non-
use of forest resources when exploitation is planned—are brought into 
play to measure and impact upon the actuality. One could argue that 
by including the virtual in the very measurement of value, carbon 
valuation is a generative form of value. This appears to go beyond the 
opposition between culture and practical reason, because it opens up 
for the emergence of new systems of valuation that include both the 
aspect of practical reason in relation to perceived threats and necessary 
adaptations, and the aspect of cultural reason through the value of 
generativity. Through this inclusion of the virtual in the valuation of 
the actual, culture can no longer be considered as an autonomous and 
arbitrary tertium quid between the human subject and the objective 
world as in Sahlins’s original theoretical framework (1976), but it 
should rather be understood as a subject-driven interface that may 
transform society through the generation of new forms of valuation.  
We expect that a focus on the potential generativity of cultural 
forms is a productive way to advance the anthropological theory of 
value, by including the virtual in the evaluation of the actual. Not only 
does such theory allow for an alternative understanding of social 
change and the emergence of new institutions. It might also better 
equip anthropologists to participate in productive multidisciplinary 
discussions about alternative systems of valuation, such as quality-of-
life and carbon credits. 
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